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The purpose of this study was to investigate the determinants and extent of whistleblowing 
policy disclosures of companies that are listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE). 
A disclosure index was developed and used to quantify the extent of disclosures. The 
association between whistleblowing policy disclosures and determinants related to the 
firm’s characteristics, its legal environment, the ethical environment as well as corporate 
governance characteristics were also investigated. The study utilized the legitimacy and 
institutional theories (coercive isomorphism) to evaluate the extent of disclosures. The 
study measured the extent of disclosures of whistleblowing policies in the annual reports 
of NSE listed companies and the moderating effect of  implementation of the Code of 
Corporate Governance Practices for Issuers of Securities to the Public 2015 (Code) using 
a disclosure index. Based on a review of the NSE listed company websites and annual 
reports, the study found that there is a low whistleblowing policy disclosure. Most key 
determinants had a positive association with the scope or extent of whistleblowing policy 
disclosures with firm size being the exception as it was found to be negatively correlated 
in this study. The study also found that the implementation of the 2015 Code led to an 
increase in the extent of whistleblowing policy disclosures and adds weight to the theory 
that companies will legitimate their activities by increasing their disclosures in a shifting 








Whistle-blowing has been defined by Transparency International as the “disclosure of 
information about perceived wrongdoing in an organization, or the risk thereof, to 
individuals or entities believed to be able to effect action” (2012). It has also been described 
by Near & Miceli (1985) as "the disclosure by organization members (former or current) 
of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons 
or organizations that may be able to effect action". Whistle-blowing is a preventive 
measure that is used to decrease the likelihood of malpractice and irregularities occurring 
within an organization. It is a tool that helps organizations monitor their business principles 
and policies more effectively by creating a mechanism where information about 
irregularities can be obtained early and acted upon. An effective whistleblowing system 
allows fraud to be detected on a timely basis and gives the company the opportunity to 
investigate the reported matter thereby minimizing the cost of fraud (Chung et al., 2004). 
Bowden and Smythe (2009), Paul and Townsend (1996), and Miceli et al. (2009), 
emphasize that it is significant because  it also avoids litigation, claims for damages and 
increases staff commitment and loyalty. By so doing, it increase the safety and welfare of 
employee.  
The findings of a report submitted by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners to the 
Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse for Sub-Saharan Africa (2018), revealed that 
tips - whistleblowing - was the most common means through which fraud was identified 
(40% and above of cases). When organizations had a hotline for reporting misconduct, 
48% of cases were detectable, compared to only 25% in organizations without a hotline. 
Organizations with hotlines had 50% smaller fraud losses compared to those without. The 
importance of whistle-blowing as a means of detecting fraud was clear because more cases 
were discovered this way than the next three detection methods (internal audit, 
management review and account reconciliation) combined. Further just over half of all tips 
provided were by employees of the victim organizations while about a third were from 
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outsiders (customers, vendors, and competitors). In addition 14% of the tips were made 
anonymously showing that a large number of whistleblowers did not want to be known.  
Whistleblowing policies indicate a firm’s commitment to listening to any reports of 
wrongdoing and addressing them in the right manner. In so doing, they emphasize the 
importance of acting ethically which improves the organizations ethical climate (Weller, 
1988). In addition, when proper training/communication of the policy is carried out to 
employees and other stakeholders, it makes them aware of the facilities they can make use 
of to report any concerns. For example, if employees are aware of the telephone hotline, 
they are likely to utilize it in the event they have something to report as opposed to going 
to other channels such as the media or the regulator. Thus, employees have a higher 
likelihood of blowing the whistle using internal channels if they are aware of them (Miceli 
and Near, 1988). 
Whistleblowing policies have also been seen to reduce employees' fear of retaliation 
because they provide guidance on the appropriate action that should be taken by a 
whistleblower when needed. Studies have shown that there is a higher chance that an 
employee will reveal information to an external party if there is a possibility of retaliation. 
Jos et al. (1989) affirm this noting that employees have a higher likelihood of blowing the 
whistle to outsiders when reprisals are present. Keenan (1990) notes that  when workers in 
a company are afraid of retaliation, they perceive their employer as being unable to provide 
sufficient protection in the event of retaliation, and therefore cultivating an atmosphere that 
discourages whistleblowing.  
Having a whistleblowing policy is important but not enough. It is imperative that the right 
actions are taken when a matter is reported and that the whistleblower is not victimized. 
The company leaders must be seen to support whistleblowers and not intimidate them as 
well respond quickly to investigate the wrongdoing and take corrective action. It must also 
protect those who blow the whistle from retaliation, including job loss. If employees 
perceive that the company is not responsive to instances of whistleblowing they will want 
to blow the whistle or utilize the channels provide by the company.  
Near and Miceli (1987) found that when whistleblowers knew where they could disclose 
information, they had a greater likelihood of doing so, but this was also influenced by the 
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potential whistleblowers perception of whether the channel was effective. They add that 
if the potential whistleblower perceives the channel to be ineffective, they would rather 
not report a matter or they may decide to report it using another channel. It can therefore 
be concluded that if organizations put in place good whistleblowing policies and respond 
effectively when any matters arise, it increases the chance that potential whistleblowers 
will use the prescribed medium to raise concerns about ethical issues. Knowing exactly 
where to disclose information regarding potential misconduct or unethical practices is 
particularly important when it involves an employee’s immediate supervisor or other 
employees in management positions. By being aware of where to share information, 
employees are more likely to feel empowered to report wrongdoing when it involves 
those in authority over them. To encourage these kinds of disclosures, organizations 
should have written policies and a commitment to treat all wrongdoings fairly at all levels 
of the organization. Regularly reviewing these policies and their implementation, 
including what happens if wrongdoing is suspected or observed and making amends 
when the approach is ineffective, is beneficial. In addition, employees need to feel 
confident that their supervisor will not initiate any reprisal against them, and this needs to 
be emphasized both within the policy as well as in practice.  
1.1.1      Whistleblowing in Kenya 
Transparency International Kenya in their August 2006 report said that having 
whistleblowing laws in itself does not guarantee that wrongdoing will be reported. Instead, 
it is when whistleblowers have assurance of protection under existing laws that they are 
confident in blowing the whistle. They refer to the Goldenberg scandal, a significant 
financial scandal in Kenya involving approximately $1 billion and another case where a 
journalist fled the country for two years when he blew the whistle on the Anglo Leasing 
scandal in which a government tender of over 90 million Kenya shillings was allegedly 
awarded to a phantom company.  
Kenya does not have a specific whistleblower protection law. There are however provisions 
in other pieces of legislation aimed at reducing corruption, encouraging good governance 
and providing assurance to any individual who has witnessed a crime that they are 
protected against retaliation. These legislations include the 2003 Anti-Corruption and 
5 
 
Economic Crimes Act as well as The Public Officer Ethics Act of 2003. In addition, the 
2006 Witness Protection Act and the Bribery Act and the Access to Information Act both 
legislated in 2016, also describe important provisions for whistleblowers.  
Section 65 (1) of the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Act (2003) provides protection 
for persons that provide assistance or disclose information to the Ethics and Anti-
Corruption Commission (EACC) or its investigators. The Bribery Act (2016) protects 
whistleblowers in the public and private spheres. It defines a whistleblower as one who 
makes a report to the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) or other law 
enforcement agencies on bribery. Whereas this Act provides for penalties to those who are 
responsible for retaliation to whistleblowers, it does not provide remedies for 
whistleblowers that suffer negative consequences because of reporting unethical conduct. 
Additionally, this Act requires all law enforcement agencies to put up measures to protect 
whistleblowers but does not compel other government agencies or private entities to do the 
same, making whistleblowers more vulnerable. 
Section 41 of The Public Officer Ethics Act (2003) discourages whistleblowing as it states 
that “A person who, without lawful excuse, divulges information acquired in the course of 
acting under the Act is guilty of an offence and is liable, on conviction, to a fine not 
exceeding five million shillings or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or 
to both”. However, the Access to Information Act (2016) permits members of the public 
to request for information from the government and mandates public servants to ensure 
that they avail the information, or otherwise risk incurring heavy penalties or even serve 
time in jail.  In the third section of the 2006 Witness Protection Act (2006) protection is 
provided only to those who are willing to testify in court. For example, it provided 
protection to many witnesses in the International Criminal Court (ICC) in relation to the 
2007 post-election violence (Bowry, 2012). 
The Code of Corporate Governance Practices for Issuers of Securities to the Public 2015 
(CCGI) sets out principles as well as specific guidelines that listed or unlisted companies 
issuing securities to the public should follow so as to ensure that quality governance 
practices are a core element in their corporate culture and business processes. Although the 
CCGI was effected on 15 December 2015 and immediate implementation was encouraged, 
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companies had no later than one year, that is, by 15 December 2016, before implementation 
was mandated. Companies are therefore expected to have a statement of policy regarding 
good governance as well as the status of the application, at the close of each year in their 
annual reports.    
The CCGI (2015) stipulates that the board is responsible for establishing a whistleblowing 
policy for the company and monitoring its effectiveness. The objective of this kind of 
policy is to ensure employees have the necessary support and feel empowered to speak up 
and report anything they deem improper, unethical or inappropriate. In addition, it 
encourages identification and challenging of misconduct at all levels within the company, 
as well as provides clear guidelines for how it should be reported. Furthermore, the policy 
ensures that all disclosures are taken seriously, and that confidentiality is upheld, and takes 
measures to reassure employees against any fears related to retaliation. Finally, the policy 
ensures that a proper system is in place so that disclosures are managed in a professional, 
consistent and timely manner.  The CCGI requires that the board shares its whistleblowing 
policy on its website as well as in its annual company report. According to Transparency 
International Kenya’s Business Integrity Country Agenda (BICA) report (2018), there is 
limited information on the guidelines that public and private organizations utilize for 
reporting misconduct to sufficiently safeguard employees who want to divulge information 
regarding wrongdoing. .  
1.2 Statement of the Problem  
The training provided by organizations about whistle-blowing is an important determinant 
for employees on whether or not they will report wrongdoing using internal systems or 
external ones. When employees are made aware of the whistleblowing channels and 
processes, the employer demonstrates their support for whistleblowing (Cho & Song, 
2015). Furthermore, when employees know what channels are available for them to report 
encourages them to speak up in the event they observe wrongdoing (Berry, 2004; Near & 
Miceli, 2008). Based on research carried out by Near and Miceli (1996), lack of awareness 
of the organization’s internal reporting mechanism was a factor that made an employee 
report misconduct or unethical practices using another channel. 
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Whistleblowing policy disclosures are a significant element in the establishment of 
effective systems for whistleblowing within a company because research has shown that 
the intention to report grows as the quality of the policies also increases (Barnett et al. 
1993; Schwartz 2001). According to Somers (2001), there were less wrongdoings or 
incidences of misconduct in companies with ethical guidelines or codes. In addition, 
Barnett et al. (1993) noted that individuals within a company were more likely to report 
unethical behaviours when internal policies were present. It can therefore be inferred that 
the reporting behaviours of employees in regards to whistleblowing are influenced by 
whether or not whistleblowing policies are present and of high quality as well as their 
perceived effectiveness. 
The CCGI requires that the boards of companies disclose their whistleblowing policy in 
their annual report and website. This study therefore sought to establish the extent of 
whistleblowing policy disclosures by those companies that are listed on the NSE through 
examining their annual reports and websites for compliance with the CCGI. This research 
study also investigated specific determinants which have an influence on the scope of 
whistleblowing policy disclosures by NSE-listed companies.  
1.3 Research Objectives 
1.3.1    General Objective  
This research focused on examining the determinants and extent of whistleblowing policy 
disclosures of companies which are listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange. 
1.3.2 Specific Objectives  
The specific objectives were: 
1. To establish the extent of whistleblowing policy disclosures in the annual reports and 
websites of companies which are listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange. 
2. To investigate the determinants of whistleblowing policy disclosures by companies 
listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange. 
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3. To examine the moderating effect of The Code of Corporate Governance Practices for 
Issuers of Securities to the Public 2015 on the association between the whistleblowing 
policy disclosures and its determinants. 
1.4 Research Questions  
The research questions for this study were: 
1. What is the extent of whistleblowing policy disclosures in the annual reports and 
websites of companies listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange? 
2. What are the determinants of whistleblowing policy disclosures by companies listed 
on the Nairobi Securities Exchange? 
3. What is the moderating effect of The Code of Corporate Governance Practices for 
Issuers of Securities to the Public 2015 on the association between the whistleblowing 
policy disclosures and its determinants? 
1.5 Scope of the Study  
This study looked at whistleblowing policy disclosures in the websites and annual reports 
of all companies listed on the NSE during the period 2013 to 2018. The main justification 
for using NSE companies is because of the general interest that capital providers (investors, 
lenders, creditors, etc.) have in these companies as compared to private companies.  
Furthermore, NSE companies are mandated by law to publish their financial statements 
annually and since 2016 must include information on their whistleblowing policy in their 
annual reports and websites. Further, NSE companies are more visible and likely to have 
websites and thus have a greater chance of having their annual reports on their websites. In 
addition, they have a higher likelihood of providing information regarding their 
whistleblowing policy on their websites. 
1.6 Significance of the Study  
This research can help companies take a closer look at what they are currently reporting 
regarding their whistleblowing policies and make some adjustments to ensure that they are 
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providing the right information online through their websites as well as their annual 
company reports. 
Regulators may also benefit from the findings of this research by having information about 
what NSE listed companies are reporting on their whistleblowing policies. In addition, 
regulators can use this knowledge to come up with relevant standards for whistleblowing 
policy disclosures so as to protect employees or third parties with reporting intentions to 
improve their trust in company’s whistleblowing systems. 
This research will also contribute to a greater appreciation for ways the disclosure theories 
are applied in a developing capital market. This study will also provide empirical evidence 
investigating the association or relationship between variables that are company-specific 
and the extent of disclosures, thus contributing to a deeper understanding of the way quality 
disclosure is achieved. By analysing company characteristics in relation to disclosure, 
insights into the explanatory power of theories are obtained. 
1.7 Organization of the document 
This thesis has five chapters. The first looks at the problem, the research objectives, the 
scope and justification of the research. The second one offers a review of the relevant 
literature and theories that relate to disclosures as well as their determinants. The third 
describes the research design and methodology that will be utilized in the study. The fourth 
outlines the findings of the research while chapter five discusses the interpretation of 





2.1 Introduction  
This second chapter starts with a review of two theories followed by what other researchers 
have found in regards to whistleblowing policy disclosures. The next section of the chapter 
looks at the determinants of whistleblowing policy disclosures, how they are evaluated and 
what other researchers have used to do this. In the last section of the chapter, the researcher 
examines the conceptual framework and discusses the different variables and how they are 
interrelated. 
2.2 Legitimacy theory 
Legitimacy theory has to do with the perception that an organization is constantly striving 
to function within the norms or values that are set out by the society in which it is operating 
in. (Deegan 2009). This theory implies that a ‘social contract’ between a company and the 
communities in existence around it (Deegan & Samkin 2009 and Deegan 2006). This 
contract is about whether the organisation is operating according to the expectations of 
society. A company tries to ensure that it abides by the standards of society so as not to 
lose its legitimacy since maintaining their honour in the eyes of society is important for the 
company’s continued survival.   
Societies have both explicit and implicit expectations. These expectations shaped by the 
law, can be considered an explicit expectation or legal requirement. There are also non-
legislative societal exceptions which can be described as implicit expectations and are 
shaped by the moral standards and values of the community. As such, society’s expectation 
of legitimacy could be explicit or implicit.  
Corporations may lose their legitimacy even when their ways of operating have not 
changed. O’Donovan (2002, p. 348) stated that this could occur because of a change  in 
social awareness, media influence, pressure from lobby groups and pressure from 
regulatory or institutional sources. They may also lose their legitimacy when members of 
the public concerned with a specific issue become aware of new information (Milne & 
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Patten, 2002). In this scenario, company operations may still be running the same way for 
some time, but its relevant public are not aware of the information. In addition, it may have 
been difficult to obtain information that is now easily accessible to the public with some 
help from government. When this information is readily available to the public, 
corporations need to close any actual or potential legitimacy gaps.  
Companies use various strategies, such as public disclosure, to close their legitimacy gap 
with the public (Lindblom, 1994). Whistleblowing policy disclosures, for instance, can be 
seen as one of the public disclosure tools used by corporations to maintain or reclaim their 
legitimacy. According to Lang and Lundholm (1993), the annual company’s report is the 
primary means of communication about its legitimate activities. Whistleblowing has 
become a significant issue and the public expects corporates to respond. This pressure can 
force companies to change their business activities and, in some cases, their business 
structure and today, they face a legitimacy threat. In order for them to continue business 
operations in a corrupt and fraud-ridden economy, it is crucial for companies to have 
measures in place in order to mitigate fraud risk as well as corruption. Companies must 
also take responsibility in informing society about their whistleblowing policies to be 
legitimate in society. This research suggests that following expiration of the CCGI effective 
date, more companies that are listed on the NSE have provided whistleblowing policy 
disclosures in their annual report to legitimize their activities. 
2.3 Institutional theory 
Institutional theory addresses various organizational forms and seeks to provide an 
understanding behind the homogeneous characteristics or forms that are present among 
organizations that are considered to be in the same "organisational field" (Fernando and 
Lawrence, 2014). An organizational field has been defined by DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) as those organizations that holistically have a recognized or shared institutional life 
which includes elements such as: “key suppliers, resource and product consumers, 
regulatory agencies, and other organisations that produce similar services or products”. 
Institutional theory notes that organizations operate in a framework that is shaped by 
assumptions, social norms and values which in turn determines which economic 
behaviours a society deems as acceptable or appropriate Oliver (1991). Therefore, in 
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accordance with institutional theory, it is in the best interests of organizations to conform 
to the expectations of an organizational field they stand to gain the capability to survive, 
an increase in legitimacy, as well as resources for continued existence (Scott 1987). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) have argued that when the structures within an organizational 
field are in place, it results in the emergence of forceful powers within a society that then 
cause the constituent organizations in the field to become more alike. Institutional theory 
consists of two dimensions: decoupling and isomorphism. Decoupling, involves the 
discrepancy between an organization’s external image, and its daily practices. Dillard, 
Rigsby, and Goodman (2004) define decoupling as a situation whereby the formal 
organizational structure is distinct and separate from its organizational practices.  A 
company’s actual practices may or may not align with the external expectations of the 
public, and this separation may either be an intentional or unintentional action of the 
organization (Moll et. al., 2006). In relating decoupling to CSR reporting practice, Deegan 
(2009) notes that decoupling may be linked to elements of legitimacy theory because 
environmental and social disclosures can compel organizations to portray an image of 
themselves that could be distinctly different from their actual social and environmental 
practices. Thus, through their corporate reports, an organization may create an image of 
social and environmental responsibility and yet in actuality, managerial practices are 
fuelled more by maximizing profits and increasing shareholder value (Deegan, 2009). 
Isomorphism, on the other hand, refers to the constraining forces that compel one unit 
within a population to become similar to the other units because they are facing conditions 
within their environment that are the same (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). They further note 
that isomorphism best describes the process that occurs during homogenization. Moll, 
Burns, and Major (2006) view isomorphism as broken down into two types: competitive 
and institutional. Competitive isomorphism, as the name suggests, has to do with the 
competitive forces that compel organizations to put in place the most efficient structures 
as well as adopt practices that are least costly (Moll et al., 2006).  
According to DiMaggio & Powell (1983), institutional isomorphism consists of three 
different kinds of isomorphism processes that are described as: coercive, mimetic and 
normative.  Coercive isomorphism stems from the pressure exerted by critical stakeholders 
such as shareholders, employees or the government and causes an organization to change 
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its institutional practices (Deegan 2009). Coercive isomorphism works to create 
homogeneity within organizations because a company may feel coerced to align their 
practices according to the expectations and demands of its most significant stakeholders. 
These critical stakeholders, such as the government and regulatory bodies, may also have 
the same expectations of other organizations, thus resulting in uniformity of institutional 
practices across different companies.  
When a regulating body uses its coercive pressure that is informed by the legal and political 
institutions, it impacts an organization’s decisions, including the choice about what 
information they are required to reveal (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott, 1995). Thus, 
the legal environment becomes a prime example of coercive pressure since the authority 
of the law is considered a higher force that supersedes the organizational authority.  
Principally, coercive pressure, which comes about from the authority, both legal and 
political, which is exercised by a regulator (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott, 1995), 
causes companies to reveal mandatory information. The company’s legal environment is a 
good example of coercive pressure where legal authority is greater than the organisational 
authority. 
As legal environments have become more pervasive, a number of changes in regulations 
have been made and these in turn require structural adjustments within organizations. The 
more that organizations are willing to adjust their internal structures and environment in 
response to the demands of new legal developments, the more they can maintain or enhance 
their legitimacy (Chen and Roberts, 2010).  
Mimetic isomorphism takes place when a company does not know what action it should 
take and therefore emulates the behaviour of other companies which are more successful 
or legitimate in its operating environment (Skelcher et al. 2015). A company that does not 
adopt the behaviours of others in its industry risks losing legitimacy (Unerman and Bennett, 
2004).  
Normative isomorphism relates to the beliefs, values and norms held by companies 
operating in the same environment (Tucker 2010). It is largely driven by professions as the 
formal training and memberships determine what is considered as acceptable in a 
company’s environment (De Villiers and Alexander, 2014). 
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Institutional isomorphism undergirds this research as it underscores the significance of an 
influential stakeholder in an organization’s policies increasing homogeneity among 
constituent members. In this research, the focus is on the influence of one critical 
stakeholder, namely, the Capital Markets Authority (CMA), on whistleblower policy 
disclosures by companies listed on the NSE. CMA’s introduction of the mandatory 
requirement for all publicly listed companies to include their whistleblower policies in their 
annual reports as well as websites effective 4 March 2016, was necessitated by the need to 
enhance transparency and improve the level of whistleblowing policy disclosures in Kenya. 
It is therefore anticipated that there will be a significant increase in the extent of 
whistleblower policy disclosures as a direct reaction to the demands made by the regulator. 
Thus, this research hypothesizes that the extent of whistleblower policy disclosures by 
NSE-listed companies increases between 2013 and 2018. 
2.4 Empirical Review of Extant Literature 
Those who use financial statements of companies have made increasing demands for better 
quality information. The annual reports and websites of companies are a primary medium 
through which leaders of organizations use to disseminate relevant information to various 
stakeholders.  Wallace et al. (1995) and Owusu-Ansah (1998) both describe disclosure as 
the dissemination or communication of economic information about a company’s financial 
position and its performance. This information can take various forms including financial 
or non-financial and quantitative or otherwise.  
Mandatory disclosure stipulates the minimum amount of information that must be 
contained within a company’s report (Owusu-Ansah, 1998). Not surprisingly, regulators 
often compel companies to share the kinds of information that companies may prefer to 
remain hidden). Thus, one of the primary concerns for regulatory bodies is to ensure they 
protect and preserve the wellbeing of the ordinary investors by putting in place disclosure 
regulations (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986 and Taplin et al., 2002). In addition, Healy et al., 
1999, argue that regulators seek to shorten the information gap by requiring a minimum 
level of disclosure in order to ultimately redistribute the wealth between those investors 
who are informed and those who are not. Furthermore, the existence of a disclosure 
regulation increases the credibility of the information in the capital markets, and thus in 
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turn increases the credibility of the company’s financial capabilities (Al-Htaybat et al., 
2006). In this research, the Capital Markets Authority (CMA) in Kenya requires mandatory 
disclosure of whistleblowing policies in their yearly reports and in websites of all 
companies that are listed on the NSE.  
Disclosure is often qualitative and narrative in nature and is not easily measured objectively 
(Leuz at el., 2008). Determining what financial information is meaningful and considered 
high-quality disclosure to users of this information is challenging because there is little to 
no guidance.  Disclosure is therefore measured differently. One common way, is to base it 
on the experts’ perceptions of what investors consider important and useful. For instance, 
financial analysts from different groups provided their expertise during the development 
of ratings by some researchers, although critics have noted that the rankings may have been 
biased due to the influence of the objectives of potential sell-side analysts (Lang et. al., 
1993; Healy et. al., 1999; Nagar et. al., 2003). Others have measured disclosure by 
constructing their own checklists (Aljifri, 2008, Bruslerie et al., 2010, Cooke.1989, Cerf. 
1961; Omar et al., 2011).  
2.4.1 Determinants of whistleblowing policy disclosures 
For an effective internal whistleblowing system to be established, a significantly high level 
of disclosure to the employees within a company is required. The robustness of the kind of 
whistleblowing system that is implemented, and therefore reflected in a company’s 
disclosures, will inevitably be influenced by the costs versus benefits of implementation. 
This study will examine factors that are related to the firm, including: economic, legal, 
ethical and corporate governance. The factors impacting each company include its size, 
cash, inventory and accounts receivables in relation to current assets, the number of cases 
reported in Kenya Law Reports, its cross-listing status, the existence of an active hotline 
service, independence of the audit committee, concentrated shareholding and an explicit 




2.4.1.1 Firm characteristics 
i) Firm size 
Since large companies have significantly greater publicity within their societal context 
(Watts and Zimmermann, 1986), there is a higher likelihood that they will act in accordance 
with the societal expectations. (Gray et al. 1995). One of these expectations may be the 
implementation of a whistleblowing system and the demand that the company discloses 
information about it to various stakeholders. There is therefore greater pressure for larger 
companies to implement whistleblowing systems and have greater disclosures in this 
regard, than smaller ones.  
Direct oversight and control of employees’ actions is challenging for large companies and 
this may therefore encourage the use of hotlines for reporting wrongdoing (Calderon-
Cuadrado et al., 2009). Further to this, the bureaucracy that is commonplace in most large 
companies can stifle upward communication of information with employees perceiving 
that finding the right manager to look into a critical matter is difficult or impossible. 
Managers in these companies will ensure that they disclose comprehensive information 
regarding their whistleblowing policy to ensure that employees are clear about where to 
report any concerns therefore avoiding reputational and other types of damage (Near and 
Miceli, 1987).  
Large companies also have a higher likelihood of sharing more information due to the large 
number of stakeholders they are accountable to, including customers, suppliers, investors 
and analysts. These stakeholders demand more information about the company as it has an 
impact on their activities and the company may have to oblige.  
Large companies are likely to incur fewer costs in the implementation of whistleblowing 
systems when compared to smaller ones due to the differences in their economic 
capabilities (McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). In addition, since smaller companies may 
incur greater average costs compared to the benefits, they may choose not to implement a 
whistleblowing system.  
A large company’s impact on the economy can be considerable especially if they employ 
a large number of staff, consume or import a large quantity and value of raw material or 
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produce a large quantity of goods and services. As a result, they must also navigate political 
pressures such as the expectation from society to engage in initiatives that demonstrate 
social responsibility, as well as regulations like higher taxes, price controls, as well as the 
threat of being nationalized (Jensen and Meckling (1978). To minimize this, they disclose 
less information as it removes them from the spotlight of policy makers (Wallace et al., 
1994). Furthermore, some managers may consider certain information to be exclusive as it 
could cause loss of competitive advantage thus lowering profits (Dye 1985a). As a result 
they would minimize the disclosure of such information.  
ii) Current assets 
Current assets are generally at a higher risk of fraud. Companies with higher levels of cash, 
inventory and accounts receivables have a greater probability of exposure to internal 
control risks, including those that are related to timely recognition, proper measurement, 
recording as well as misreporting due to theft (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 2007). In their study 
findings, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2007) noted that internal control deficits were more likely 
to be reported by firms that had a higher level of inventory in comparison to those with 
lower levels. It is therefore predicted that those companies which have more current assets 
(cash, inventory and accounts receivables) have a greater likelihood of implementing a 
whistleblowing system so as to proactively mitigate fraud risk.   
2.4.1.2 Legal environment 
i) Number of reported cases 
The risk of litigation often prompts firms to make voluntary disclosures. Field et al. (2005), 
note that when firms are faced with possible litigation, they are more likely to voluntarily 
disclose information. In addition, those organization with bad news also have a higher 
chance of releasing information in order to prevent the likelihood of a lawsuit. The 
possibility of litigation is therefore an important factor that managers within an 
organization consider when deciding whether or not to disclose information. Thus, the risk 
of litigation increases the likelihood of a company making voluntary disclosures. 
Companies with a greater risk of litigation or those with adverse information tend to reveal 
more so as to decrease the likelihood of potential litigation. 
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ii) Cross-listing status 
Registering a company for trading on a foreign stock exchange means that it may have to 
abide by the regulations of that market which including disclosures in yearly reports that 
are over and above those of the home stock exchange. This expected increase in the level 
of detail assumes that the minimum information required by the foreign country is higher 
than that which is expected in the home country, although this may not always be the case 
(Choi, 1973 and Meek and Gray (1989). For instance, in the US, audit committees are 
required  to put in place  proper systems for receiving, retaining as well as handling 
complaints obtained by the company including information regarding accounting, auditing 
matters, internal accounting controls, as well as any whistleblowing submissions 
(Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 2002). Thus, US cross-listed companies have a greater likelihood of 
having well-established whistleblowing policies and hotline services (Worlton 2005). 
It can therefore be argued that a company that has a listing in its home and a foreign stock 
exchange would provide greater level of information in its annual report compared to a 
company listed only in its local exchange. This is because the company may have to abide 
by the disclosure guidelines of more than one stock exchange and is likely to adhere to the 
one with the highest requirements. However, Biddle and Saudagaran (1989 and 1991) 
found that companies may also be in foreign markets that have lesser requirements of 
disclosure when compared to their local exchange market. 
Information in the yearly reports of listed and unlisted companies likely varies. Federation 
des Experts Comptables Europeens IFEE (1992) found that in Europe listed companies 
provided a greater level of detail when compared to unlisted companies as revealed in their 
yearly reports. Having the registered office of a company in another country is not the same 
as listing one’s company in the foreign stock exchange. It only makes it necessary for the 
company to comply with the accounting regulations in the foreign nation since it must 
regularly file reports with the relevant authority in that country.  
2.4.1.3 Ethical environment 
Existence of active hotline service 
A good whistleblowing policy is one that has credibility. Weaver et al. (1999) point out 
that simply having a whistleblowing policy is not the same as a good system and therefore 
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does not guarantee credibility. In addition, Hassink et al. (2007) argue that a standard 
whistleblowing policy may lack credibility as it likely does not adapt the policy to fit the 
dynamics of its establishment. Weaver et al, (1999) observed that companies they analyzed 
complied with the cost-effective symbolic ethical requirements by adopting various codes 
and polices, however, a significant number of these companies failed in implementation 
and enforcement of the guidelines in their daily operations. Thus, an effective 
whistleblowing system requires not only a good policy but implementation and continuous 
monitoring.  
Standards Australia (2003) recommended the adoption of highly visible and dedicated 
reporting tools such as hotlines by companies committed to developing effective 
whistleblowing mechanisms. ACFE (2018) have found that hotlines are the most utilized 
and effective form of reporting fraud and that their presence decreases losses incurred 
through fraud by the highest percentage. This is because they can allow for anonymity 
when reporting which reduces the likelihood of retaliation against the whistleblower 
(Bierstaker et al., 2006; Holtfreter 2005). It also allows employees to report at their 
convenience especially if it is a 24-hour service (Asgary and Mitschow 2002). The set-up 
of hotlines by companies often allows for employees located in different geographical 
locations to utilize the same channel which makes it cost-effective (Bierstaker et al. 2006 
and Calderon-Cuadrado et al. 2009). Lastly, having a hotline reduces the likelihood of 
unethical practices because it increases the perception that any employee engaging in 
wrongdoing will be reported (Bierstaker et al. 2006). 
2.4.1.4 Corporate governance characteristics 
The structures of governance within a company have an impact on the internal systems of 
control which are established for fraud detection, compliance and to enhance credibility. 
(Coram et al. 2008; Davidson et al. 2005). When there is a significant number of external 
directors on audit committees, as well as the presence of concentrated shareholdings, 
increased pressure for robust monitoring systems including effective whistleblowing 
mechanisms becomes inevitable (Davidson et al. 2005).  Thus, it can be hypothesized that 
companies which have good governance structures within their corporation have an 
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increased chance of having higher whistleblowing policy disclosures and having a hotline 
service in place. 
i) Size and independence of the audit committee 
Fama and Jensen (1983) found that boards that have more non-executive directors monitor 
management more effectively, which increases information disclosure. In addition, when 
non-executive independent directors are present, it limits the probability that management 
can engage in unscrupulous behaviour (Eng and Mak, 2003). As Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 
highlight, non-executive directors are often seen as honourable and respectable advisors 
who in turn have the potential to increase the credibility and quality of a company’s 
disclosure Research has shown that non-executive directors positively influence a 
company’s compliance with mandatory disclosures (Morris & Gray, 2005). As earlier 
indicated, when audit committees have external directors, they exert greater pressure for 
more effective monitoring systems to be in place (Davidson et al. 2005). It is therefore 
anticipated that the more independent audit committee members there are, the more it 
increases whistleblowing policy disclosures. 
ii) Concentrated shareholding 
Concentrated shareholders are those who have an unusually high number of shares. In 
developed countries, concentrated shareholding is negatively correlated with disclosure 
while in developing countries, there were mixed results. For instance, Samaha and Dahawy 
(2011) found a negative correlation among companies in Egypt between voluntary 
disclosures and concentrated shareholding. Companies with less concentrated shareholding 
have a higher chance of revealing information so as to meet the needs of investors while 
those investors with concentrated shareholding can usually obtain relevant information 
through internal channels and therefore management is not inclined to disclose as much 
information.  
iii) Commitment to fighting fraud 
The ethical environment of a company has an impact on an individual's choice to report 
wrongdoing (Near and Miceli 1985). When companies support whistleblowing, they are 
more likely to put in place better mechanisms. In addition, those companies encouraging 
whistleblowing have a greater chance of implementing a hotline system in order to 
21 
 
facilitate reporting of wrongdoing (McDonald, 2000). In this study, the commitment to 
fighting fraud will be determined by whether each NSE-listed company explicitly states its 
commitment and support for whistleblowing in their annual reports or in its whistleblowing 
policy. 
2.5 Critique of the Literature 
It is predicted that the implementation of whistleblowing systems, as measured by extent 
of corporate disclosure and implementation of a hotline service, is associated with the size,  
cash to current assets ratio, inventory to current assets ratio, accounts receivables to current 
assets ratio, number of cases reported in Kenya Law Reports,  cross-listing status, existence 
of an active hotline service, size and independence of the audit committee, concentrated 
shareholding and an explicit statement of commitment to fighting fraud. 
This study is important as there is very limited empirical research in Kenya on the 
disclosure of whistleblowing policies by companies. Moreover, no other study has 
examined the impact of the CCGI on whistleblowing policy disclosures by companies that 
are listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange. It is this significant gap in the empirical field 
that this research seeks to address by analyzing the extent of whistleblowing policy 
disclosures and its determinants for companies that have been listed on the Nairobi 
Securities Exchange, as well as the moderating effect of the CCGI on the association 
between whistleblowing policy disclosures and its determinants. This information will help 
the public have greater confidence in trading in the stocks of these companies. Regulators 
will also be able to know what NSE listed companies are reporting on their whistleblowing 
policies as well as enable them come up with relevant standards for whistleblowing policy 
disclosures so as to protect employees or third parties with reporting intentions to improve 
their trust in company’s whistleblowing systems. 
2.6 Conceptual Framework  
This research sought to identify the key variables that have an influence on the relationship 
between the extent of whistleblowing policy disclosures and the determinants for 
companies that are listed on the Nairobi Securities Exchange. It also examines the 
moderating effect of the CCGI on this association. The selected variables have been 
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derived from previous studies that have looked at the relationship between key company 
characteristics, its environment and the extent of whistleblowing policy disclosures. They 
include the independent, dependent and the moderating variables.   
The independent variables the determinants of whistleblowing policy disclosures and 
comprises of firm characteristics, its legal environment, ethical environment and corporate 
governance. The dependent variable is the extent of whistleblowing policy disclosures as 
influenced by the independent variables. The moderating variable is the institutionalization 
of the CCGI which was the reference point to determine the extent of whistleblowing 
policy disclosures and its determinants for companies that are listed on the Nairobi 
Securities Exchange, before and after its implementation. 






Figure 1: Conceptual framework 
Dependent Variable  
Extent of whistleblowing 
policy disclosures 
Moderating Variable  
The effective date of the Code of 
Corporate Governance Practices 
for Issuers of Securities to the 
Public            
Pre & Post 2016 
Independent Variable  
Determinants of whistleblowing 
policy disclosures 
1. Firm characteristics 
a. Size 
b. Current assets 
2. Legal environment 
a. No. of cases reported in 
KLR 
b. Cross-listing status 
3. Ethical environment 
a. Active hotline service 
4. Corporate governance  
a. Size and independence of 
the audit committee 
b. Concentrated shareholding 




2.6.1 Operationalization of the Study Variables 
Ten independent variables are studied in this research: size, cash, inventory and accounts 
receivables to current assets ratios, inventory to current assets ratio, accounts receivables 
to current assets ratio, number of cases reported in Kenya Law Reports, cross-listing status, 
existence of an active hotline service, independence of the audit committee, concentrated 
shareholding and an explicit statement of commitment to fighting fraud. The definition and 
measurement of variables are shown in the table below: 
Table 2.1: Measures and sources of the determinants 
Determinants Measure Sources 
Firm characteristics 
Size Total assets Calderon-Cuadrado 
et al., 2009, Reverte 
2009, Holder-Webb 
et al., 2008 
Cash Cash, inventory and accounts 






No. of cases reported in Kenya Law 
Reports (KLR) 
Number of cases in KLR Field et al., 2005 
Cross-listing status Listed in more than one country Worlton, 2005 
Ethical environment 
Active hotline service Existence of a telephone hotline  Hassink et al., 2007, 
Bierstaker et al., 
2006 
Corporate governance characteristics 
Audit committee independence Number of independent audit 
committee members 
Haniffa & Cooke, 
2002, Susilowati, 
Morris & Gray,  
2005 
Davidson et al., 
2005 
Concentrated shareholding Percentage of top shareholders Samaha and 
Dahawy, 2011 
Commitment to fighting fraud Existence of a statement of 
commitment to fighting fraud 
Chung et al., 2004 
McDonald, 2000 
2.7 Chapter Summary 
Chapter two presented a literature review and the theoretical and conceptual framework 
that were adopted in the study in order to explain companies’ motivation regarding 
whistleblowing policy disclosures in their annual reports and websites. Furthermore, 
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various determinants of whistleblowing policy disclosures were discussed including how 






This chapter discusses the techniques and tools applicable in examining the determinants 
and extent of whistleblowing policy disclosures of companies that are listed on the Nairobi 
Securities Exchange. This chapter describes the companies that will be studied, the process 
of data collection and the measurement system. The requirements of reliability and validity 
of content analysis are also discussed. An overview of statistical analysis is also provided. 
3.2 Research Philosophy 
Ontology is the manner in which a researcher defines what is true and interprets reality, as 
well as the link between one’s research and the various philosophical roots, thus clarifying 
their theoretical framework (Cohen, et al. 2000). Ontology has to do with the integral 
question about whether social entities are viewed as subjective or objective. Thus, 
objectivism (or positivism) and subjectivism are two significant pillars of ontology. The 
positivism research philosophy guided this study as it was best suited to highly structured, 
stable data which can be observed and described objectively as well as measured 
quantitatively without interference with the study variables (Levin, 1988). In addition, 
observations can be used to make predictions and explain reality as well as relationships 
between variables.  
This research was a quantitative research that operated under the assumption of objectivity. 
It assumed that the reality was observable (whistleblowing policy disclosures) and that any 
logical observer who looked at the same observable fact would no doubt concur on its 
existence as well as its associated characteristics. The data collection techniques focused 
on obtaining hard data in the form of numbers in order that evidence would be presented 
in quantitative form (Sarantakos, 2005; Neuman, 2003). A standardized disclosure index 
was used to measure what is observed. Variables were measured and the relationship 
between them was expressed using effect statistics such as correlations and regression.  
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3.3 Research Design  
This study examined panel data for six years (2013 - 2018). Examining panel data seeks to 
investigate the relationship that exists among the variables being studied over a given 
timeframe and therefore uses a cross sectional analysis approach. (Huang et al., 2008b). 
This research was descriptive as it sought to find out the extent of whistleblowing policy 
disclosures before the effective implementation date of the CCGI as well as after it came 
into effect.  
3.4 Population 
The targeted study population for this research was NSE listed companies. There were 65 
listed companies at the time of carrying out this study (31 December 2018) and all of these 
were included in this particular study. This was therefore a census study as all elements of 
the population were considered for the study. The entire population was used as it is a small 
population that is also well defined. 
The main justification for using NSE companies was because of the general interest that 
investors have in these companies as compared to private companies. In addition, NSE 
listed companies are mandated to be in compliance with the corporate governance practices 
and since 4 March 2016, they were required to disclose their whistleblowing policies in 
their websites as well as their annual reports.. Further, companies which are listed on the 
NSE have easily available annual reports. These companies are also more visible and have 
a greater probability of having websites and therefore likely to provide the annual reports 
as well as their whistleblowing policy on these public online platforms.  
3.5 Data Collection Methods 
The dependent variable in this research, the extent of whistleblower policy disclosures, was 
measured using a disclosure index. According to studies by Brown et al., (2005) and 
Nurhayati et al., (2006), a disclosure index is the most preferred technique when levels of 
disclosure are being measured in developing nations. In addition, it has been noted by 
Cooke and Wallace (1989) and Hossain et al., (1995) that the disclosure index is best suited 
when the researcher is seeking to gain insight into the level of information that companies 
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have disclosed. Thus, the disclosure index was considered most suitable in analyzing the 
dependent variable.  
The whistleblower policy disclosures in each company’s annual report were compared to 
the items listed in the disclosure index and coded as either one or zero, depending on 
whether the given content conformed to the items that had been listed (Meek et al., 1995). 
For each company, a disclosure index was calculated as the ratio of the total score that was 
awarded to the company divided by the maximum number of items that were applied to 
the entity (Meek et al., 1995). Consequently, the level or degree of disclosure was treated 
as a continuous variable when it was measured by the disclosure index. To minimize the 
possibility of subjectivity, all the items in the index were unweighted, meaning that each 
of the disclosure items in the index were considered to be uniformly important to all the 
companies. 
The effective date of the CCGI was measured by the effective date of 4 March 2016. The 
data collected was for the period 1 January 2013 to 31 December 2018, a six year period. 
The period was divided into two three year periods: the pre-CCGI period (2013 to 2015) 
and the post-CCGI period (2016 to 2018) to allow for analysis of disclosures before and 
after the implementation of the CCGI. 
3.6 Data Analysis 
The following regression model was utilized in analysing the extent of whistleblowing 
policy disclosures: 
𝑊𝐵 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 ∑ 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1
+  𝛽2 ∑ 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑛𝑣. 𝑖𝑡
𝑛
𝑡=1
+  𝛽3 ∑ 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑛𝑣. 𝑖𝑡
𝑛
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The expanded specific model for the above is shown below: 
𝑊𝐵 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ & 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽4 𝐴𝑐𝑐. 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝. 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚. 𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽9 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐. 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽10 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 +  Υ𝑖 +  𝜆𝑖 +  Ψ𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖 
The model with the CCGI moderating effect is as follows: 
𝑊𝐵 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐼 +  𝛽2 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +  𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑛𝑣.
∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐼 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑛𝑣. + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑛𝑣.∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐼
+  𝛽6 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑛𝑣. + 𝛽7 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝.  𝐺𝑜𝑣.∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐼 + 𝛽8 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝. 𝐺𝑜𝑣. + Υ𝑖 +  𝜆𝑖 +  Ψ𝑡
+  𝜀𝑖 
Where:  
WB DISCL is the whistleblowing policy disclosure score;  
Υi is company control dummy; 
λi is the firm year control dummy; 
Ψt is the CCGI dummy (pre and post 2015); and 
εi is the error. 
3.7 Research Quality 
Content validity describes the extent to which all aspects of a given construct are 
represented within a measure (Knabe, 2012). In order to establish content validity, the 
researcher sought feedback from practitioners who reviewed the pilot instrument. The 
practitioners were persons who are experts in the use of whistleblowing tools in the Kenyan 
market. After the pilot test was conducted, the questions were refined as needed to 
eliminate ambiguity or provide clarification.  
Internal validity has to do with the degree to which the independent variable affects the 
dependent variable. This study looks at the extent to which independent variables: firm 
characteristics, the legal and ethical environment and corporate governance, affect 
whistleblowing policy disclosures. A disclosure index was utilized in measuring the 
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dependent variable. (Williams, 1998). Hackston and Milne (1996) also found that using a 
disclosure index does not affect the regression results, making them more reliable. 
According to Cooke (1989), the level of disclosure by a company can be examined in two 
ways: weighted and unweighted (Cooke, 1989). Those who advocate for a weighted 
approach (Copeland et al., 1968; Courtis, 1979; Barrett, 1977) consider that all items of 
information have different importance and therefore, professional judgment is required in 
order to make a determination regarding the weight. In this approach, the result is a scale 
of disclosure item that varies from zero to one. The way in which scores are allocated along 
the continuum is however somewhat subjective since it is determined by the evaluator’s 
professional judgment that is dependent on their level of experience and knowledge 
(Cooke, 1989). For this study, in order to minimize subjectivity, the items in the index were 
unweighted meaning that each disclosure item that was in the index was considered 
uniformly significant for all the companies that were part of the study. 
3.7.1 Diagnostic tests 
In this study, a reasonable correlation was anticipated between the variables. The 
dependent variables were not expected to have a high degree of multicollinearity which 
indicates redundant dependent variables and decreases statistical efficiency. 
Multicollinearity was assessed through the examination of Spearman‘s rho correlation 
matrices. According to Field (2009) and Pallant (2007), variables whose r-value is equal 
to 0.9 and above are considered to be highly correlated. 
Rank regression analysis was utilized in order to provide additional confidence in the 
statistical results because it lessens the impact of outliers and measurement errors, as well 
as residual heteroscedasticity on the regression results (Cheng et al. (1992), Ho and 
Mathews (2002) and Wallace et al. (1994)). 
The normality of the dependent variables was tested using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
statistic. For the dependent variables, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statistic for checking for 
normality is p= 0.00. 
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3.8 Ethical Issues in Research 
The researcher complied with the ethical requirements of Strathmore University during 
data collection. All the available data required for this research was publicly available. 
Information obtained from companies’ annual reports and whistleblowing policies were 





PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH FINDINGS 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the analysis of data analysis and the findings of this study. The first 
sections covers an analysis of the results of whistleblowing policy disclosures and the 
extent thereof while the second section covers the results of the data analysis of the 
determinants of the whistleblowing policy disclosures. 
4.2 Sample Characteristics 
The NSE had 65 companies listed on the Securities Exchange at the outset of this study. 
The final list of companies for this study contained 57 companies due to de-listing of two 
companies, lack of annual reports and whistleblowing policies for the period or having 
information pertaining to only one portion of the timeframe of this study. Of the list of 57 
companies that remained, there were 37 missing observations for some of the companies. 
Only those companies with data for the period were included in the study. The details of 
the companies that whose data formed the final sample for analysis are shown in table 4.1 
below: 







Number of listed companies as at 31 December 2018 64 384 
Number of de-listed companies (2) (12) 
Number of companies omitted  due to missing observations (4) (24) 
Number of companies with data only pertaining to the post-CCGI 
period (1) (6) 
Missing observations from the final sample of companies (-) (37) 
Companies in the final sample 57 305 




Table 4.2: Sample industry sector representation 
Panel B: 
Industry No. of companies No. of observations Percentage 
Agricultural 6 35 11% 
Automobiles & Accessories 2 12 4% 
Banking 11 53 17% 
Commercial and Services 8 42 14% 
Construction and Allied 5 26 9% 
Energy and Petroleum 5 29 10% 
Insurance 6 32 10% 
Investment 4 23 7% 
Investment Services 1 5 2% 
Manufacturing and Allied 8 42 14% 
Telecommunication and Technology 1 6 2% 
Total 57 305 100% 
  
The above table shows the company industries as classified by the NSE. There are 11 
industries and the number of companies and observations for each are indicated. The 
industry with the highest number companies and observations is the banking industry 
followed by Commercial Services and Manufacturing & Allied industries. The industries 
with the lowest representation are Investment Services and Telecommunication & 
Technology as they have one company each. 
4.3  Diagnostic tests 
The data collection was captured in Microsoft Excel. Once this was completed, each of the 
variables were checked to ensure that there were either no errors or that any errors were 
corrected by referring to the respective documents (annual report or whistleblowing 
policy). After the data was cleaned, certain variables were coded for ease of analysis and 
interpretation. The data was then uploaded in Minitab and Eviews which are the two 
statistical softwares used to perform the statistical tests for this study.  
4.3.1 Normality tests 
Selecting appropriate statistical tests depends on, among other factors, whether or not the 
data is normally distributed. When it is normally distributed, the most appropriate tests are 
parametric statistics (Keller, 2011) while non-parametric statistics are best suited for data 
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that is not normally distributed. Normality tests were conducted using the Kolmogorov-









Figure 2: Tests of normality 
According to the results in Figure 4.2, the coefficient on the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is 
0.308 which is significant at the 1% level. Further the Q-Q and the box plots illustrate that 
the dependent variable is not normally distributed. The results in Appendix 4 also show 
that the kurtosis and skewness are 3.180 and 1.409 respectively which confirmed that the 
data did not conform to the normality assumption. A non-parametric approach was 
therefore employed in analysing the data and variables. All three tests showed that the data 
was not distributed normally and therefore non-parametric statistics were utilized for 
analysis of the variables.  
4.3.2 Multicollinearity test  
In this study, it was expected that there would be reasonable correlation between variables 
but not have a high multicollinearity of the independent variables as this would have 
indicated redundant variables and decreased statistical efficiency. Multicollinearity was 
therefore determined from a review of Spearman‘s rho correlation matrix. According to 
Field, 2009 and Pallant, 2007, variables are highly correlated when the r-value is greater 
than or equal to 0.9. The correlation coefficient was found to be 0.800 which indicated that 
multicollinearity was not a concern.  
   
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test Box-plot test Q-Q plot test 
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Multicollinearity was tested using variance inflation factors which determines the extent 
by which the variance of an estimated regression coefficient goes up due to correlation of 
the predictors. When the VIF is higher than the range of 5-10, it means that there is poor 
estimation of the regression coefficients (Montgomery and Peck, 1982). On the hand, if the 
range of VIFs is between 1-5, it shows that there is no multicollinearity observed between 
the variables. Table 4.3 below shows the results of the test: 
Table 4.3: Test for multicollinearity using variance inflation factors 
Variable 
Variance inflation 
factors (VIF) Tolerance (1/VIF) 
Ln Total assets 1.500 0.667 
Cash/CA 1.100 0.909 
Inv./CA 1.000 1.000 
Acc. Rec./CA 1.100 0.909 
Legal cases 1.100 0.909 
Cross-listing 1.000 1.000 
Hotline  1.700 0.588 
Aud. comm. size 1.900 0.526 
Aud. comm. indep.  2.200 0.455 
Conc. ownership 1.600 0.625 
Commitment 1.300 0.769 
 
4.3.3 Autocorrelation 
Autocorrelation was used to measure the similarity between the whistleblower disclosure 
observations for each year. The result of the Durbin Watson test was 1.008 which indicated 
a positive autocorrelation. This was dealt with by including as many variables as possible 
from the literature that may have had an effect on the extent of whistleblowing policy 
disclosures. 
4.4 Descriptive statistics 






4.4.1 Descriptive statistics on whistleblowing policy disclosures 
The first objective of this study was to establish the extent of whistleblowing policy 
disclosures in the annual reports and websites of companies listed on the Nairobi Securities 
Exchange. The average disclosure scores are shown in the table below: 


















Contents & scope 4 270  0.191  103 0.452 
Nature of 
violations to be 
reported 
2 130  0.184  46 0.404 
Official/body to 
whom wrongdoing 
should be reported 
2 134  0.189  48 0.421 
Reporting 
guidelines 
1 53  0.150  23 0.404 
Anonymity and 
confidentiality 





5 257  0.145  103 0.361 
Investigation 
details 
5 283  0.160  89 0.312 
Disclosure score 21 1,268 0.198 474 0.396 
The t-test for the average disclosure score in the annual reports and websites is -7.14 (p=0.000). 
 
The average disclosure scores for whistleblowing policy disclosures were low in both the 
website annual reports of NSE companies. The average for annual reports was 0.198 while 
that of websites was higher at 0.396. A detailed comparison of average disclosure scores 
is shown in Appendix 3.  
The highest category of whistleblowing policy disclosures was anonymity and 
confidentiality for both the annual reports and the website. The lowest category of 
whistleblowing policy disclosures was in protection from retaliation for the annual 





4.4.2 Descriptive statistics for other variables 
The second objective of the study was to investigate the determinants of whistleblowing 
policy disclosures by NSE companies. The statistics for the determinants are 1in table 4.5 
below:  
Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics for other variables 
Variable 
 
Observations  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
 
Minimum  Maximum 
WB disclosures - 
annual reports 
305.000 0.198 0.000 0.359 0.000 0.952 
Ln Total assets 305.000 18.594 18.188 3.456 11.649 26.542 
Cash/CA 305.000 0.303 0.193 0.285 0.001 1.000 
Inv./CA 305.000 0.290 0.218 0.276 0.000 0.989 
Acc. Rec./CA 305.000 0.408 0.396 0.260 0.000 0.945 
Legal cases 305.000 13.374 0.000 69.535 0.000 512.000 
Cross-listing 305.000 0.105 0.000 0.307 0.000 1.000 
Hotline  305.000 0.354 0.000 0.479 0.000 1.000 
Aud. comm. size 305.000 4.334 4.000 1.762 2.000 10.000 
Aud. comm. indep.  305.000 1.370 1.000 1.399 0.000 5.000 
Conc. ownership 305.000 0.558 0.735 0.392 0.003 1.000 
Commitment 305.000 0.725 1.000 0.447 0.000 1.000 
The results in table 4.5 above show that a typical listed company has an average (median) 
whistleblowing policy disclosure of 0.198 (0.000). This indicates that the NSE listed 
companies have low disclosures in the annual reports although the maximum indicates that 
there are some companies with high disclosures. The variables for inventory to current 
assets ratio, legal cases, cross-listing, hotline and audit committee size and independence 
have a minimum of zero which indicates that those items did not exist for the specific 
companies.  
4.5 Correlation analysis 
Since the data was found to be non-parametric, the rank spearman correlation was utilized 
to measure the correlation between the determinants of whistleblowing policy disclosures 
and the extent of whistleblowing policy disclosures. From the results in table 4.7, most of 
the variables have a positive association to whistleblowing policy disclosures at the 5% 
38 
 
significance level. These include the cash to currents assets ratio, the number of legal cases, 
the existence of a hotline, the audit committee size and independence, the percentage 
concentrated ownership and the existence of a commitment to fighting fraud in the annual 
report. Four of the variables have a negative association to whistleblowing policy 
disclosures at the 5% level of significance which includes total assets, inventory and 
accounts receivables to current assets ratio and the cross-listing status. According to the 
results in the above table, the highest correlation coefficient is 0.673 while the lowest 
coefficient is 0.628 which is less than 0.8000 which indicates that multicollinearity is not 
a cause for concern. In order to establish the determinants of whistleblowing policy 































Ln Total assets -0.175           
p-value 0.00           
Cash/CA 0.159 -0.064          
p-value 0.01 0.27          
Inv./ CA -0.038 0.066 -0.628         
p-value 0.50 0.25 0.00         
Acc. Rec/ CA -0.073 -0.091 -0.414 -0.294        
p-value 0.20 0.11 0.00 0.00        
Legal cases 0.234 -0.121 0.190 -0.086 -0.177       
p-value 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.14 0.00       
Cross-listing -0.024 0.065 -0.050 0.014 0.155 -0.081      
p-value 0.67 0.26 0.39 0.80 0.01 0.16      
Hotline  0.664 -0.266 0.123 0.019 -0.089 0.239 -0.097     
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.74 0.12 0.00 0.09     
Aud. comm. size 0.105 -0.113 0.143 -0.091 -0.079 0.407 -0.064 0.014    
   p-value 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.11 0.17 0.00 0.26 0.80    
Aud. comm. indep.  0.308 -0.234 0.110 -0.014 -0.120 0.369 -0.058 0.349 0.613   
   p-value 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.81 0.04 0.00 0.31 0.00 0.00   
Conc. ownership 0.212 0.175 0.027 0.018 -0.148 -0.228 -0.071 0.363 -0.174 -0.052  
   p-value 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.75 0.01 0.00 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.36  
Commitment 0.040 0.232 -0.012 -0.015 -0.071 0.119 -0.148 -0.050 0.172 0.026 -0.238 




4.6 Regression analysis 
The generalized linear model of regression was used since the data are not normal (non-
parametric) with the specific regression equation used being the binomial proportion logit 
model. The following model was used to investigate the influence of each of the 
determinants on the whistleblowing disclosures: 
𝑊𝐵 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽3 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ & 𝑏𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑡
+  𝛽4 𝐴𝑐𝑐. 𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽6 𝐶𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽7 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 ℎ𝑜𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝. 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚. 𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽9 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑐. 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽10 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝑓𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡 +  Υ𝑖 +  𝜆𝑖 +  Ψ𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖 
The results of the model are shown below: 
with cash to current assets ratio: 
                     = 0 + -0.291 + 1.024 + 0.003 + 1.009 + 3.059 + 0.041 + 0.278 + 0.313 + 0.773 
 = 6.209 
with inventory to current assets ratio: 
                    = 0 + -0.267 + -1.071 + 0.004 + 0.939 + 3.081 + 0.035 + 0.308 + 0.353 + 0.971 
                    =   4.353 
with accounts receivables to current assets ratio: 
        = 0 + -0.252 + - 0.586 + 0.003 + 1.012 + 3.078 + 0.029 + 0.297 + 0.217 + 0.684 
                   = 4.482 
The variables were coded as follows: size (0=less than Kshs 100 million and 1=greater than 
Kshs 100 million), cash, inventory and accounts receivables to current assets ratios (0=less 
than 0.5, 1=0.5 and greater), number of legal cases (0=less than 10, 1=greater than 10), 
cross-listing status (0=not cross-listed, 1=cross-listed), existence of a hotline (0 = non-
existent, 1= exists), independent audit committee members (0 = less than 2, 1=2 and 
above), concentrated shareholding (0=less than 70%, 1=70% and above) and commitment 
to fighting fraud (0=non-existent, 1= exists). The convergence was achieved after 5 




Table 4.7: Regression analysis of determinants and whistleblowing policy disclosures  
Variable 
GLM - Binomial Logit 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 



























































Deviance statistic 2.591 2.581 2.614 
Akaike info criterion 2.968 2.958 2.991 
Pearson statistic 3.027 3.217 3.068 
Hannan-Quinn criterion 3.012 3.002 3.035 
*** significance at 1% 
The number of legal cases was found to have the highest impact on the extent of 
whistleblowing policy disclosures with significance at the 1% level. Total assets has a 
negative association with the extent of whistleblowing policy disclosures with significance 
at the 1% level. 
4.7 Whistleblowing policy disclosures pre and post-CCGI 
The third objective of the study was to examine the moderating effect of the CCGI on the 
association between the whistleblowing policy disclosures and its determinants. This is 




4.7.1  Pre and post-CCGI 
Table 4.8 below shows the average whistleblowing policy disclosure scores for the items 
in the disclosure index during the pre-CCGI period as well as the post-CCGI period. The 
overall disclosure score is also given: 
Table 4.8: Whistleblowing policy disclosures pre and post-CCGI  







Duty to report 0.187 0.199 0.193 
Scope employees 0.152 0.228 0.190 
Scope non-employees 0.193 0.263 0.228 
Training 0.181 0.175 0.178 
Reportable violations 0.181 0.228 0.205 
Failure to report 0.175 0.175 0.175 
Hotline 0.199 0.216 0.208 
Contact details 0.181 0.187 0.184 
Reporting guidelines 0.158 0.152 0.155 
Confidentiality 0.181 0.222 0.202 
Anonymity 0.199 0.222 0.211 
Good faith 0.018 0.012 0.015 
Non-retaliation 0.181 0.222 0.202 
Action taken 0.170 0.164 0.167 
Protection given 0.187 0.240 0.213 
Specific protection 0.164 0.146 0.155 
Recipients 0.170 0.175 0.173 
Fair investigation 0.193 0.234 0.213 
Investigation process 0.146 0.129 0.137 
Progress notification 0.158 0.146 0.152 
Feedback 0.164 0.140 0.152 
Overall WB 
disclosures 0.168 0.184 0.198 
Paired T for Overall Pre CCGI – Overall Post CCGI 
T-Test of mean difference = 0 (vs not = 0): T-Value = -2.46  P-Value = 0.023 
Mann-Whitney Test and CI: Overall Pre CCGI, Overall Post CCGI  W = 405 
Test of ETA1 = ETA2 vs ETA1 not = ETA2 is significant at 0.2472 
Significant at 0.2462 (adjusted for ties) 
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The overall whistleblowing policy disclosure score during the pre-CCGI period was 0.168 
which increased to 0.184 in the post-CCGI period. The largest increases in the average 
disclosure score between the pre and post-CCGI implementation pertained to disclosure 
that the whistleblowing policy applies to employees as well as non-employees. There was 
a reduction in the average disclosure score between the pre and post-CCGI implementation 
periods for disclosures pertaining to reporting in good faith, training, reporting guidelines, 
actions taken for retaliation, notification of progress of investigation, the investigation 
process, specific protection provided to whistleblowers and the feedback provided to 
whistleblowers on the outcome of the investigation. Feedback had the highest decrease 
between the two periods. There was no change in the failure to report disclosure item 
between the two periods. 
4.7.2  Trends in whistleblowing policy disclosures over time (years) 
Figure 3 below shows the overall whistleblowing policy disclosure scores over the six year 
period. In the pre-CCGI period (2013 to 2015), there was a decline in overall disclosures 
in 2015 when compared to 2013 and 2014. However, this increases in the post-CCGI period 
(2016 to 2018) which implies that there was a positive influence on the extent of disclosures 
after implementation of the CCGI. 
 
















Pre-CCGI period Post-CCGI period 
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Figure 4 below shows the trend of specific whistleblowing policy disclosures over the six 
year period. The post CCGI implementation period has higher disclosures as compared to 
the pre-CCGI period. Disclosures for reporting in good faith were the lowest while 
disclosures on the scope applying to employees were highest during the period. 
 
Figure 4: Specific whistleblowing policy disclosures over time 
4.8 Moderating effect of the CCGI 
The moderating effect of the CCGI on the determinants and whistleblowing policy 
disclosures is seen in table 4.9 below. The following model was used to investigate the 
moderating effect of the CCGI on the determinants and whistleblowing policy disclosures: 
 𝑊𝐵 𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝐿𝑖𝑡  =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 ∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐼 +  𝛽2 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑋𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 +  𝛽3 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑛𝑣.∗
𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐼 + 𝛽4 𝐿𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑛𝑣. + 𝛽5 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑛𝑣.∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐼 +  𝛽6 𝐸𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑛𝑣. + 𝛽7 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝.  𝐺𝑜𝑣.∗ 𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐼 +
𝛽8 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑝. 𝐺𝑜𝑣. + Υ𝑖 +  𝜆𝑖 +  Ψ𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖 
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= 0 + -6.750 + -11.669 + 0.067 + 0.705 + 3.000 + 3.383 + 1.87 + 1.803  
= -7.590 
Table 4.9 below shows the moderating effect of the determinants and whistleblowing 
policy disclosures: 
Table 4.9: Moderating analysis of determinants and whistleblowing policy disclosures  
Variable 
GLM - Binomial Logit 
Without CCGI With CCGI Moderation 
Coefficient Coefficient 















































Pearson statistic 2.991 2.998 
Hannan-Quinn criterion 2.893 5.333 
Akaike info criterion 2.835 5.661 
Deviance statistic 2.458 4.108 
** Significance at 5% 




The coefficient on firm size (Ln Total Assets) is -0.099 in the pre-CCGI period which is 
significant at the 1% level and increases to -0.207 in the post-CCGI period and is still 
significant at the same level. This indicates that the negative correlation between firm size 
and whistleblowing policy disclosures is strengthened following the implementation of the 
CCGI. 
The coefficient on the cash to current assets ratio (Cash/CA) is -2.925 in the pre-CCGI 
period which is significant at the 1% level. The coefficient changes to 0.318 in the post-
CCGI period and loses significance at the 1% level. This implies that the negative 
association between the cash to current ratio and whistleblowing policy disclosures 
changes to a positive one a following the implementation of the CCGI.  
The coefficient on the inventory to cash ratio drops minimally from the pre-CCGI period 
to the post-CCGI period but the effect is still present and significant at the 1% level.  
The coefficient on the receivables to current assets ratio is -3.454 in the pre-CCGI period 
which is significant at the 1% level. The coefficient changes to -2.784 in the post-CCGI 
period and loses significance at the 1% level. There is a drop in the negative association 
between the receivables to current ratio and whistleblowing policy disclosures. There is 
also a decline in the significance level but it is still significant at 1%. 
The coefficients on the number of legal cases is 0.002 in both the pre and post-CCGI 
periods with a minimal drop in the significance level though it is still significant at 1%. 
The coefficient on the cross-listing status, the existence of an active hotline, the audit 
committee independence and the commitment to fighting fraud drop in the post-CCGI 
period thereby losing significance at the 1% level. This means that the positive correlation 
between these variables and the whistleblowing policy disclosures weakens following 
implementation of the CCGI.  
The coefficients on the audit committee size and the concentrated ownership increases in 
the post-CCGI period with significance at the 1% level. This means that the positive 
correlation between these variables and the whistleblowing policy disclosures increases 
following implementation of the CCGI. 
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For the period 2016 to 2018, the whistleblowing policy disclosures increased and this is 
significant at the 5% level. This implies a positive contribution of the CCGI on the extent 
of whistleblowing policy disclosures by listed companies. 
Figure 5 below is a graphical representation of the moderating effect of the CCGI on the 
determinants and whistleblowing policy disclosures: 
 
Figure 5: Graphical representation of the moderating effect of the CCGI 
4.9 Summary of Results 
57 NSE listed firms formed the final sample of companies. The data was found not to be 
normally distributed and thus non-parametric tests were used to carry out the statistical 
tests. In addition, the panel data was found to be unbalanced as there were missing 
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The average whistleblowing policy disclosure score was low for disclosures both in the 
annual reports and the websites of NSE companies. However, the disclosures on websites 
were almost twice that in the annual reports. The highest category of whistleblowing policy 
disclosures was anonymity and confidentiality for both annual report disclosures as well as 
website disclosures. The lowest categories were protection from retaliation and 
investigation details for annual report and website whistleblowing policy disclosures 
respectively. 
Most of the variables had a positive correlation with whistleblowing policy disclosures 
with the existence of a hotline having the strongest positive correlation. Four variables had 
a negative correlation with whistleblowing policy disclosures with the highest of these 
being the total assets. There CCGI positively influences the extent of whistleblowing policy 
disclosures by NSE companies during the period 2016 to 2018. 
4.10 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter discusses the key findings of the study. There was low disclosure by the NSE 
companies in their websites and annual reports, with the highest category being anonymity 
and confidentiality. The lowest categories were protection from retaliation and 
investigation details for annual report and website whistleblowing policy disclosures 
respectively. In addition, most of the variables were found to have a positive correlation 





DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the interpretation of the results of the research based on the objectives 
and the implications. The first section summarizes the research findings after which follows 
the general conclusions of the study. The third part discusses the contribution to knowledge 
after which recommendations arising from the study as well as suggestions for further 
research are discussed. The final part of the chapter discusses the limitations of the study. 
5.2 Summary of the Findings 
This study sought to establish the extent of whistleblowing policy disclosures in the 
websites and annual reports of NSE companies. The extent of whistleblowing policy 
disclosures as per the disclosure score was low in both websites and the annual reports of 
NSE listed companies. On average, the disclosure on websites by the NSE listed companies 
was higher than that in the annual reports with whistleblowing policy disclosures in 
websites being almost twice that in the annual reports.  
The second objective of the study was to investigate the determinants of whistleblowing 
policy disclosures by companies listed on the NSE. Most of the determinants were found 
to have a positive correlation to whistleblowing policy disclosures at the 5% significance 
level include the cash to currents assets ratio, the number of legal cases, the existence of a 
hotline, the audit committee size and independence, the percentage concentrated ownership 
and the existence of a commitment to fighting fraud in the annual report. Four of the 
determinants had a negative association to whistleblowing policy disclosures at the 5% 
level of significance and they included total assets, inventory to current assets ratio, 
receivables to current assets ratio and the cross-listing status. The number of legal cases 
was found to have the highest impact on the extent of whistleblowing policy disclosures 
with 1% significance level while total assets had the highest negative association with the 
extent of whistleblowing policy disclosures with significance at the 1% level. 
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The third objective of the study was to examine the moderating effect of the CCGI on the 
association between the whistleblowing policy disclosures and its determinants. The 
overall whistleblowing policy disclosure score during the pre-CCGI period was 0.168 
which increased to 0.184 in the post-CCGI period and this is significant at the 5% level. 
This means that there is a positive influence of the CCGI on the extent of whistleblowing 
policy disclosures by the NSE listed companies. 
5.2.1 Summary of the extent of whistleblowing policy disclosures by NSE listed 
companies  
The average disclosure scores for whistleblowing policy disclosures were low in both the 
annual company reports and websites of companies that are listed on the NSE. The average 
for annual reports was 0.208 while that of websites was higher at 0.396. The findings align 
with the theories of legitimacy and institutionalism which assert that companies should 
have measures to mitigate fraud risk as well as corruption. This is vital in order to inform 
society about corporate whistleblowing policies so as to increase the company’s legitimacy 
in the society and it has also been demanded by the regulator. After the effective date of 
the CCGI, companies listed on the NSE have provided more whistleblowing policy 
disclosures in their reports and websites so as to legitimize their operations and in order to 
comply with the regulator’s instructions.  
A possible reason for the lack of disclosure by the NSE companies is the direct cost of 
production and dissemination of whistleblowing policy disclosures. First, there may be a 
direct cost associated with producing and disseminating information. Secondly, some of 
the NSE companies may perceive a loss of competitive advantage or bargaining power 
since the disclosed information is available to competitors and other strategic partners. 
Finally, NSE companies may simply not be aware of what constitutes adequate 






5.2.2 Summary of the determinants of whistleblowing policy disclosures by NSE 
listed companies 
The findings indicated that the size of the firm was negatively associated with 
whistleblowing policy disclosures indicating that some of the largest firms have low 
disclosures. Hassan, Giorgioni and Romilly (2006) highlighted the importance of firm size 
as a key determinant of a company’s practices in regards to their corporate disclosures. 
Their findings were however inconclusive, as it can either be positive or negative. The 
findings in this study which indicated that larger NSE listed companies had lower 
disclosures aligns with research that posits that organizations which have greater visibility 
face mounting political pressure that can increase the likelihood of disclosing less 
information in their yearly reports and websites. These pressures may take the form of 
expectations from the society to demonstrate responsibility for societal concerns, as well 
as greater regulations including higher taxes, the threat of nationalization as well as 
increased price controls (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
A positive correlation was noted between whistleblowing policy disclosures and inventory 
and receivables to current assets ratios. Since current assets are generally at a higher risk 
of fraud, companies that have a larger volume of inventory and receivables are more likely 
to implement a system that would minimize the risk of fraud and have this clearly disclosed 
in key sources of information for stakeholders. The cash to current assets ratio had a 
negative correlation to whistleblowing policy disclosures which can be attributed to NSE 
listed companies carrying out much fewer cash transactions preferring electronic and 
mobile payment options. 
The number of reported legal cases was found to be the greatest influence when 
determining the extent of whistleblowing policy disclosures, and this is consistent with 
studies that have shown that greater litigation risk tends to cause companies to disclose 
more information to avoid possible lawsuits (Field et al., 2005). 
The cross-listing status of companies had a negative correlation to whistleblowing policy 
disclosures. In their work, Biddle and Saudagaran (1989 and 1991) and Saudagaran and 
Biddle (1992) observed that companies tended to list in foreign exchange markets where 
the disclosure guidelines were less stringent when compared to their local markets. This 
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appeared to be the case for NSE listed firms which are cross-listed in other East African 
countries that generally have less stringent disclosure rules than Kenya or are in markets 
where enforcement is less likely. 
The existence of a hotline and the commitment to fighting fraud had a positive correlation 
with the extent of disclosures related to whistleblowing policies. This is in line with the 
literature which suggests that companies that have a hotline and who explicitly indicate 
their attitude towards fraud disclose information about the hotline or their stance to 
facilitate and enable the reporting of any unethical behaviour. 
The findings of this research affirmed that having more independent non-executive audit 
committee members, had a positive correlation with the extent of disclosure compliance. 
This is consistent with previous research by Chen and Jaggi (2000) and Susilowati, Morris 
& Gray (2005), which found that the size of the audit committees and independence of key 
leaders impacts whistleblowing disclosures.  
Concentrated shareholding had a positive correlation with the extent of whistleblowing 
policy disclosures which is in line with the literature which suggests that investors with 
large stocks in a company have more incentive to send positive signals to the market in 
order to increase their share price. Some studies found mixed results when comparing 
developed and developing countries. According to Samaha and Dahawy (2011), Egyptian 
companies had a negative correlation between concentrated shareholding and voluntary 
disclosures. It was noted that companies with concentrated shareholdings may use internal 
channels to obtain information and therefore may feel less inclined to divulge more 
information in their whistleblowing disclosures.  
5.2.3 Summary of the moderating effect of the CCGI on the association between 
whistleblowing policy disclosures and its determinants 
The overall whistleblowing policy disclosure score during increased during the post-CCGI 
period. In the pre-CCGI period (2013 to 2015), there was a decline in overall disclosures 
in 2015 when compared to 2013 and 2014. However, this increases in the post-CCGI period 
(2016 to 2018) indicates the positive influence of the CCGI on the extent of disclosures 
after its implementation. For the period 2016 to 2018, the whistleblowing policy 
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disclosures increased at the 5% significant level. This shows the positive contribution of 
the CCGI to whistleblowing policy disclosures by the NSE companies. 
5.3 Conclusions 
This research has reported the results of the extent of whistleblowing policy disclosures in 
the websites and annual reports and of NSE companies. The extent of whistleblowing 
policy disclosures was determined using a disclosure index and was found to be low in line 
with the previous research findings. Consistent with the findings of other research, the 
association between the extent of whistleblowing policy disclosures and the cash to 
currents assets ratio, the number of legal cases, the existence of a hotline, the audit 
committee size and independence, the percentage concentrated ownership and the 
existence of a commitment to fighting fraud were found to be positive for NSE listed 
companies but the association between the extent of whistleblowing policy disclosures and 
total assets, inventory and receivables to current assets ratio and the cross-listing status 
were found to be negative. The implementation of the CCGI had a positive influence on 
the scope of whistleblowing policy disclosures and its determinants.  
5.4 Contribution to Knowledge 
This research will help companies take a closer look at what they are currently reporting 
regarding their whistleblowing policy and make some adjustments to ensure that they are 
providing the right information in their websites and annual reports. Regulators can also 
use the findings of this research to know what NSE listed companies are reporting on their 
whistleblowing policies as well as enable them come up with relevant standards for 
whistleblowing policy disclosures so as to protect employees or third parties with reporting 
intentions to improve their trust in company’s whistleblowing systems. 
5.5 Recommendations 
5.5.1 Policy Recommendations 
This study supports prior research that both legitimacy and institutional isomorphism 
theories explain companies’ whistleblower policy disclosure practices (Suchman, 1995; 
Mobus, 2005). Legitimacy theory posits that companies are likely to increase their 
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whistleblowing policy disclosures to legitimise their activities (Deegan & Rankin, 1996). 
Companies may increase their whistleblowing policy disclosures following the threat to 
their legitimacy that mandatory disclosure of this information by the regulator (coercive 
isomorphism) posed. Institutional theory, on the other hand, shows how the external 
pressure of a regulator affects companies’ whistleblowing policy disclosures. This research 
could be extended to a study of the reasons why companies in a similar operating 
environment disclose more information in line with a regulator’s requirements yet others 
slack in doing so. The company attributes that moderate the effects of institutional 
pressures can also be studied. 
5.5.2 Recommendations for Practice/Managerial Recommendations 
It can be concluded that the CCGI influenced the NSE listed companies to provide more 
whistleblowing policy disclosures, thus mandatory whistleblowing policy disclosure 
legislation is a good policy intervention to change the reporting practices of companies. 
This finding can be helpful for the regulator in order to control whistleblowing policy 
disclosures by companies.  
Although this study finds that overall whistleblowing policy disclosure practices have 
increased over the years, there are companies whose full annual reports are not publicly 
available, others who do not have functional websites or do not have whistleblowing 
policies on their websites. Considering the importance of whistleblowing policy 
disclosures, regulators should enforce the requirement that all companies to provide their 
full annual reports and have functional websites and their whistleblowing polices on the 
websites so that stakeholders of these companies are better informed about whistleblowing 
policy disclosures. 
5.6  Suggestions for Further Research 
This research has potential for expansion and replication. Many developing African 
countries can conduct a similar research. This study found that mandatory disclosure 
requirements were an impetus to provide more whistleblowing policy disclosures. 
However, is hard to confidently confirm the reason for this increase without asking 
corporate management as they have power and control over the reported information. A 
55 
 
future study might therefore interview corporate managers to identify the prime drivers for 
disclosing whistleblowing information in their websites and annual reports to determine 
the degree to which disclosure practices were impacted by legislation. It is also 
recommended that future researchers examine whistleblowing policy disclosures for a 
longer period after the implementation of the CCGI to determine if there was greater 
compliance by the companies. 
5.7 Limitations of the Research 
There were limitations encountered in this study. The first was the lack of some of the 
annual reports and whistleblowing policies of the NSE companies. The reports were 
sourced from their websites as well as public sources while the whistleblowing policies 
were obtained from the companies’ websites only. It was not possible to obtain panel data 
for 8 of the companies as the companies had either been de-listed or no annual reports or 
policies could be found for them. 2018 was also a key year of full implementation of the 
CCGI but the full 2018 annual report for a number of the companies was not available and 
therefore information on whistleblowing policy disclosures in the 2018 annual reports was 
limited.  
The second limitation is the timeline for the study: 2013-2018. The chosen timeline relates 
to the introduction of the CCGI but is otherwise arbitrary. The CCGI was issued in 
December 2015, gazetted into law on 4 March 2016 and became fully applicable with effect 
from 4 March 2017. However, by 4 March 2017, most listed companies were in the middle 
of their financial years and the deadline for compliance was therefore pushed to April 2018. 
Full implementation of whistleblowing policy disclosures in annual reports and websites 
was therefore expected in 2018. However, this study sought to determine whether there 
was any compliance by NSE companies in the reports prior to the April 2018 deadline. 
The third limitation is the annual reports and websites used as the source of whistleblowing 
policy disclosures. Using annual reports and whistleblowing policies obtained from 
publicly available sources ignores other sources of obtaining the information. However, 
annual reports are considered as an important information source by most company 
stakeholders. Moreover, the majority of prior whistleblowing policy disclosure related 
studies use annual report as the disclosure instrument (Gray et al., 1995; Buniamin, 2012). 
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In addition, annual reports make the comparison between years easier to undertake and, 
hence, an appropriate choice for this study. 
The fourth limitation was the disclosure index, which was developed to capture 
whistleblowing policy disclosures in annual reports and whistleblowing policies obtained 
from the websites of companies. The items listed in the disclosure index had equally 
weighted scores. However, a simple scoring system (1 for existence and 0 for absence) has 
a lower degree of subjectivity and is more reliable than a weighted scoring system (Milne 
& Adler, 1999). 
Lastly, consistent with similar studies, this research only examined observable disclosures 
not actual whistle-blowing practices. Research on actual whistleblowing practices would 
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APPENDIX 3: Disclosure index 
PART I: Whistleblowing policy disclosures  
Items Scoring 
General 
Does company have a website? 0, No/ 1, Yes 
Does company have complete financial statements on its website? 0, No/ 1, Yes 
Does the company have its whistleblowing policy on its website? 0, No/ 1, Yes 
1. Contents & scope  
a. Clear statement that reporting violations is a requirement or duty 0, No/ 1, Yes 
b. Scope applies to employees (including contractors and consultants) 0, No/ 1, Yes 
c. Applicable to non-employees (suppliers, the public, customers, etc) 0, No/ 1, Yes 
d. Provision of training on the whistleblowing policy 0, No/ 1, Yes 
2. Nature of reportable wrongdoing 
a. Specific examples of reportable violations are given (corruption, bribery, theft, 
misappropriation, etc.) 0, No/ 1, Yes 
b. Failing to report wrongdoing is wrong 0, No/ 1, Yes 
3. Official/body to whom wrongdoing should be reported 
a. Dedicated hotline (telephone/e-mail/web) / specific individual within the 
organization 0, No/ 1, Yes 
* Specific individual within the organization Title of person 
b. Specific contact details of the individual are given or are said to be "found on 
website/intranet" 0, No/ 1, Yes 
4. Reporting guidelines 
a. Guidelines on how to report (specific details mentioned/special reporting form is 
provided) 0, No/ 1, Yes 
5. Anonymity and confidentiality 
a. Reported wrongdoing will be handled confidentially  0, No/ 1, Yes 
* Exceptions to confidentiality Circumstance 
b. Statement that violations can be reported anonymously 0, No/ 1, Yes 
* No reporting anonymously  0, No/ 1, Yes 
* Public disclosure (regulator, media) is not allowed without permission/is allowed 
under clear conditions 0, No/ 1, Yes 
6. Protection from retaliation 
a. Requirement that the report is made in good faith/reasonable grounds or belief of 
wrongdoing 0, No/ 1, Yes 
b. Statement that there will be no retaliation/retaliation is prohibited/not tolerated if 
report is made in good faith 0, No/ 1, Yes 
c. Action(s) to be taken if there is retaliation 0, No/ 1, Yes 
d. Statement that protection is given 0, No/ 1, Yes 
e. The kind of protection given 0, No/ 1, Yes 
7. Investigation details 
a. Statement on the individuals that will receive and investigate the reported 
violations 0, No/ 1, Yes 
b. Statement that the investigation will be fair and impartial 0, No/ 1, Yes 
c. Description of investigation process 0, No/ 1, Yes 
d. Whether whistleblowers will be informed about the start and progress of the 
investigation  0, No/ 1, Yes 
e. Statement on whether whistleblowers will receive feedback after the investigation 0, No/ 1, Yes 
Total Score          21 
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PART II: Determinants  
1. Firm characteristics 
Size 
a. Total assets Value 
Current assets 
a. Inventory Value 
b. Cash & bank Value 
c. Accounts receivable Value 
d. Current assets Value 
2. Legal environment 
a. Number of legal cases (in Kenya Law Reports) Number 
b. Cross-listed in another jurisdiction (securities exchange) 0, No/ 1, Yes 
3. Active hotline service 
a. Existence 0, No/ 1, Yes 
b. Name Name 
c. Telephone number 0, No/ 1, Yes 
d. Toll-free telephone number 0, No/ 1, Yes 
e. E-mail address 0, No/ 1, Yes 
f. Website form/reporting 0, No/ 1, Yes 
g. Multilingual  0, No/ 1, Yes 
h. Availability - 24/7 service or other 0, 24/7/ 1, OTHER 
i. Internal or outsourced whistleblower service 0, INT/ 1, EXT 
4. Corporate governance 
Audit committee independence  
a. Total non-executive audit committee directors Number  
b. Number of audit committee non-executive directors that are independent Number 
Concentrated shareholding  
a. Percentage of top 10 shareholders Percentage 
Commitment to fighting fraud  








APPENDIX 4: Disclosure scores of disclosure index items 
  
Disclosure scores 
Annual report Website 
Total 
Average 
disclosure score Total 
Average 
disclosure score 
1. Contents & scope 
a. Clear statement that reporting violations is a 
requirement or duty 66 0.186 35 0.593 
b. Applicable to employees (includes 
consultants and contractors) 65 0.184 27 0.458 
c. Applicable to non-employees (suppliers, the 
public, customers, etc) 78 0.220 36 0.610 
d. Provision of training on the whistleblowing 
policy 61 0.172 16 0.271 
Average 68 0.191 28.5 0.483 
2. Nature of violations to be reported 
a. Specific examples of reportable violations are 
given (corruption, bribery, theft, 
misappropriation, etc.) 70 0.198 33 0.559 
b. Failing to report wrongdoing is wrong 60 0.169 20 0.339 
Average 65 0.184 26.5 0.449 
3. Official/body to whom wrongdoing should be reported 
a. Dedicated hotline (telephone/e-mail/web) / 
specific individual within the organization 71 0.201 32 0.542 
b. Specific contact details of the individual are 
given or are said to be "found on 
website/intranet" 63 0.178 23 0.390 
Average 67 0.189 27.5 0.466 
4. Reporting guidelines 
a. Guidelines on how to report (specific details 
mentioned/special reporting form is 
provided) 53 0.150 24 0.407 
Average 53 0.150 24 0.407 
5. Anonymity and confidentiality 
a. Reported wrongdoing will be handled 
confidentially 69 0.195 36 0.610 
b. Statement that violations can be reported 
anonymously 72 0.203 34 0.576 
Average 71 0.199 35 0.593 
6. Protection from retaliation 
a. Requirement that the report is made in good 
faith/reasonable grounds or belief of 
wrongdoing 5 0.014 5 0.085 
b. Statement that there will be no 
retaliation/retaliation is prohibited/not 
tolerated if reporting is done in good faith 69 0.195 31 0.525 
c. Action(s) to be taken if there is retaliation 57 0.161 26 0.441 
d. Protection given 73 0.206 34 0.576 
e. Type of protection given 53 0.150 16 0.271 





Annual report Website 
Total 
Average 
disclosure score Total 
Average 
disclosure score 
7. Investigation details 
a. Statement on the individuals that will receive 
and investigate the reported violations 59 0.167 23 0.390 
b. Statement that the investigation will be fair 
and impartial 73 0.206 32 0.542 
c. Description of investigation process 47 0.133 18 0.305 
d. Whether whistleblowers will be informed about 
the start and progress of the investigation 52 0.147 10 0.169 
e. Statement on whether whistleblowers will 
receive feedback after the investigation 52 0.147 8 0.136 
Average 57 0.160 18 0.308 







APPENDIX 5: Normality table 
Variable Skewness  Kurtosis  Jarque-Bera  Probability 
WB disclosures - annual reports 1.409 3.180 101.340 0.000 
Ln Total assets 0.375 2.300 13.373 0.001 
Cash/CA 0.830 2.469 38.596 0.000 
Inv./CA 0.857 2.717 38.391 0.000 
Acc. Rec./CA 0.098 2.089 11.033 0.004 
Legal cases 6.398 44.527 23,996.890 0.000 
Cross-listing 2.578 7.648 612.568 0.000 
Hotline  0.610 1.372 52.595 0.000 
Aud. comm. size 1.222 4.154 92.868 0.000 
Aud. comm. indep.  0.650 2.222 29.133 0.000 
Conc. ownership -0.549 1.574 41.149 0.000 





APPENDIX 6: NSE companies 
No. Company Name 
Financial  
Year End 
A Agricultural  
1 Eaagads Limited 31 March 
2 Kakuzi  31 March 
3 Kapchorua Tea Co. Limited 31 March 
4 The Limuru Tea Co.  31 December 
5 Sasini  30 September 
6 Williamson Tea Kenya Limited 31 March 
B Automobiles & Accessories  
7 Car & General (K) Limited 30 September 
C Banking  
8 Barclays Bank of Kenya Limited 31 December 
9 BK Group  31 December 
10 Diamond Trust Bank Kenya Limited 31 December 
11 Equity Group Holdings  31 December 
12 HF Group  31 December 
13 I&M Holdings  31 December 
14 KCB Group  31 December 
15 National Bank of Kenya Limited 31 December 
16 NIC Group  31 December 
17 Stanbic Holdings  31 December 
18 Standard Chartered Bank Kenya Limited 31 December 
19 The Co-operative Bank of Kenya Limited 31 December 
D Commercial And Services  
20 Atlas African Industries Limited* 30 June 
21 Deacons (East Africa)* 31 March 
22 Eveready East Africa Limited 30 September 
23 Express Kenya Limited 31 March 
24 Kenya Airways Limited 31 March 
25 Longhorn Publishers  30 June 
26 Nairobi Business Ventures Limited 31 March 
27 Nation Media Group Limited 31 December 
28 Sameer Africa  31 December 
29 Standard Group  31 December 
30 TPS Eastern Africa  Limited  31 December 
31 Uchumi Supermarket  30 June 
32 WPP Scangroup  31 December 
E Construction & Allied  
33 ARM Cement* 31 December 
34 Bamburi Cement Limited 31 December 
35 Crown Paints Kenya  31 December 
36 E.A. Cables Limited 31 December 
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No. Company Name 
Financial  
Year End 
37 E.A. Portland Cement Co. Limited 31 December 
F Energy & Petroleum  
38 KenGen Company  30 June 
39 KenolKobil Limited*                 31 December 
40 Kenya Power & Lighting  Co Limited 30 June 
41 Total Kenya Limited 31 December 
42 Umeme Limited 31 March 
G Insurance  
43 Britam Holdings  31 December 
44 CIC Insurance Group Limited 31 December 
45 Jubilee Holdings Limited 31 December 
46 Kenya Re Insurance Corporation Limited 31 December 
47 Liberty Kenya Holdings Limited 31 December 
48 Sanlam Kenya  31 December 
H Investment  
49 Centum Investment Co  31 March 
50 Home Afrika Limited 31 March 
51 Kurwitu Ventures Limited 31 December 
52 Olympia Capital Holdings Limited 28 February 
53 Trans-Century  31 December 
I Investment Services  
54 Nairobi Securities Exchange  31 December 
J Manufacturing & Allied  
55 B.O.C Kenya  31 December 
56 British American Tobacco Kenya  31 March 
57 Carbacid Investments Limited 31 March 
58 East African Breweries Limited 30 June 
59 Flame Tree Group Holdings Limited 31 December 
60 Kenya Orchards Limited 31 March 
61 Mumias Sugar Co. Limited 30 June 
62 Unga Group Limited 31 December 
K Telecommunication   
63 Safaricom  31 March 
L Real Estate Investment Trust  
64 Stanlib Fahari I-REIT 31 December 
M Exchange Traded Fund  
65 NewGold Issuer (RP) Limited 31 March 
* Suspended from the securities exchange as at the date of this list 
Source: NSE website and the NSE 2017 - 18 Investors Handbook as at 31 Dec 2018 
 
